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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Benjamin J. Dahl appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional 
guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and 
possession of heroin.  On appeal, Dahl argues the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Dahl with possession of methamphetamine with intent 
to deliver, possession of heroin, possession of hydrocodone, and possession of 
oxycodone.  (R., pp.19-21, 28-30.)  Dahl filed a motion to suppress, arguing the 
evidence against him was the fruit of an unlawful entry into his home.  (R., pp.33-
42, 56-58.)  Following a hearing on the motion, the district court made the 
following factual findings: 
….  Officers arrived at a residence located at 19419 Brush Creek 
Avenue; Caldwell, Idaho.  The Officers had a felony warrant to 
serve upon James David, and their last contact with David was at 
this residence. …. 
 
 In search of James David, the Officers arrived at Dahl’s 
house on May 23, 2015 at 8:36 a.m.  The audio recording of the 
encounter was entered into evidence based upon stipulation of the 
parties.  The court’s review of the recording indicates the Officers 
knocked on Dahl’s door for several minutes before a female child 
answered the door, and the following occurred: 
 
 Officer:  Hi, how are you? 
 
 Child:  Good. 
 
 Officer:  Hey, is, uh, James here? 
 
 Child:  Who? 
  2 
 Officer:  James.  You know, James David.  I was over here 
 the other day and he was here.  Is Ben here? 
 
 Child:  I don’t know. 
 
 Officer:  Can you go look for me? 
 
State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 
2:46.  The audio evidences the door closes and the Officers chat: 
 
 Officer 1:  Little Kid? 
 
 Officer 2:  Yeah.  Too many questions. 
 
The officers begin talking over one another, making it difficult to 
decipher what is being said, and then go on to discuss other things 
before one of the Officers again knocks on the door.  When the girl 
opens the door, the following conversation occurs: 
 
 Officer:  Hey. 
 
 Child:  I think he is still sleeping 
 
 Officer:  Okay, is your parents up? 
  
 [inaudible] 
 
 Officer:  Okay, can you open the door for officer safety 
 reasons? 
 
 Child:  Yeah. 
 
 Officer:  We just need to talk to one adult.  Can you go get 
 one of your parents for me, please? 
 
 Child:  Yeah. 
 
 Officer:  May I come in? 
 
 Child:  Yeah. 
 
 Officer:  Ok. 
 
Id. at 4:46.  According to Officer Hoeksema’s testimony at the 
hearing, he then entered the residence with the permission of the 
child while his companion, Officer Hemmert, remained outside. 
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 The audio tape reveals that Officer Hoeksema briefly spoke 
with who the young girl said was her brother, before observing 
Dahl’s mother coming down the stairway.  Once Dahl’s mother 
(hereinafter, “Ms. Dahl”) came downstairs the following 
conversation ensued: 
 
 Officer:  Good morning, Ma’am.  I’m sorry to wake ya. 
 
 Ms. Dahl:  That’s okay. 
 
 Officer:  Remember me, I came by here. 
 
 Ms. Dahl:  Yeah. 
 
 Officer:  Okay. So, [inaudible]… 
 
 Ms. Dahl:  Yeah, it was. 
 
 Officer:  Is, uh, [inaudible] still living here? 
 
 Ms. Dahl:  She [presumably intending to mean the woman 
 whose name was inaudible in the Officer’s question] has 
 been staying here off and on.  I don’t’ think she is here 
 tonight. 
 
 Officer:  Okay, so what about James?  When I was here 
 James was here. 
 
 Ms. Dahl:  No, he doesn’t come by very often. 
 
 Officer:  Okay, do you know where he might be staying? 
 
 Ms. Dahl:  I don’t. 
 
 Officer:  Okay, so, I just want to throw this out here – he has 
 a felony warrant for his arrest, okay? 
 
 Ms. Dahl:  is there? 
 
 Officer:  If he is found here in this home, then people could 
 be arrested for felony harboring.  And I know that you don’t 
 want that, but, I just want to make sure that he is not here.  
 So if [inaudible] is not here, he was here with your son, 
 Benjamin.  Do you mind if we go up there and at least clear 
 to make sure that he is not here? 
 
  4 
 Ms. Dahl:  Yeah.  [Ms. Dahls’ reply does not sound 
 consenting when read in context.  However, Ms. Dahl’s tone 
 of voice, as evidenced on the audio, persuades this Court 
 that Ms. Dahl was, in fact, consenting to the Officer’s 
 request.] 
 
 Officer:  Okay, I appreciate that. 
 
State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 
7:24. 
 
 The audio then evidences knocking, presumably on Dahl’s 
bedroom door, and the following conversation ensues: 
 
 Ms. Dahl:  Ben, the police would like to see your room, 
 please.  […]  They just want to make sure James isn’t here. 
 
 Officer:  Hey Ben, its [sic] Officer Hooks, sic.  I’m the one 
 who came by here initially.  I just wanted to check with you.  
 But, more importantly, I need to find James.  So, if he is in 
 there I need you to send him out. 
 
 Officer:  Is the door [unlocked or locked]? 
 
 Officer:  Is the door [unlocked or locked]?  Do you know? 
 
 Ms. Dahl:  [No or I don’t know] he is coming.  It just takes 
 him a minute to get up. 
 
 Officer:  Hey Ben, how are you? 
 
 Ben:  Good, how about you? 
 
 Officer:  I’m not too bad.  Hey man, I’m here for James.  
 Where is he at? 
 
 Ben:  James is not here. 
 
 Officer:  Okay, do you mind if I look? 
 
 Inaudible 
 
 Officer:  Appreciate it.  Who else is in here with you? 
 
 Ben:  Just my boy. 
 Officer:  Where did you see James last? 
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 Ben:  Um, yesterday in a [band or van]. 
 
 Officer:  In a [band or van]? 
 
 Ben:  Yes, sir. 
 
 Officer:  Can I move past you real quick.  I just want to 
 check that real fast. 
 
 Inaudible 
 
 Officer:  What have you got in there?  James can you do 
 me a favor and come out here real quick?  I’ve got some 
 questions for you, man. 
 
State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 
8:17 – 10:10. 
 
 Later in the audio Officer Hoeksema states, “the issue is that 
you allowed me into your room.  I went into your closet back there 
and I found paraphernalia, which I recognize to be used for 
methamphetamines.”  State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to 
Suppress, Exhibit A at 11:31.  In his probable cause affidavit, 
Hoeksema states that while searching for James, he observed in 
plain view a glass pipe and a white crystal substance that was 
neatly divided into row along with multiple bundles of U.S. currency 
on a large mirror. 
 
(R., pp.64-67 (ellipses in first paragraph added, otherwise verbatim (including 
capitalization, punctuation, brackets, ellipses and citations)).) 
 In support of his motion to suppress, Dahl argued the eight-year-old child 
who allowed Officer Hoeksema into Dahl’s home had neither actual nor apparent 
authority to consent and, as such, Officer Hoeksema’s warrantless entry was 
unlawful.  (R., pp.33-42.)  Dahl also argued that, but for the unlawful entry, the 
evidence against him would not have been discovered.  (R., p.41.)  The district 
court denied Dahl’s suppression motion.  (R., pp.64-75.)  The court agreed with 
Dahl “that it was not reasonable for the officers to believe the child had actual 
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authority to grant them permission to enter the home” or “that such consent was 
voluntary,” and the court concluded, generally, “that an eight (8) year old does 
not have authority to consent to a search or entry of the home.”  (R., p.72.)  The 
court declined to suppress the evidence Officer Hoeksema discovered in Dahl’s 
bedroom, however, because Dahl “failed to establish that but for the initial invalid 
entry the seizure [of the evidence] would not have occurred.”  (R., p.74.)  
Specifically, the court ruled that “[e]ven though the first consent was invalid, the 
evidence establishe[d] the two other valid consents [given first by Dahl’s mother 
and then by Dahl, himself] independently justified the initial warrantless search.”  
(R., p.74.) 
 Dahl entered conditional guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine 
with intent to deliver and possession of heroin, preserving the right to challenge 
the denial of his suppression motion on appeal.  (R., pp.84-95, 99-100.)  In 
exchange for Dahl’s pleas, the state dismissed the remaining charges as well as 
a misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia charge filed in a related case.  
(R., pp.10, 122.)  The district court imposed an aggregate unified sentence of 
eight years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Dahl 
on probation for four years.  (R., pp.129-32.)  Dahl timely appealed from the 
judgment.1  (R., pp.133-36, 144-48.) 
                                            
1 Dahl also filed a notice of appeal in the misdemeanor paraphernalia case, and 
the two cases were consolidated for appeal. (R., p.143.)  Because Dahl does not 
raise any appellate issue related to the paraphernalia case, as explained in 
Section I, the state is seeking dismissal of Dahl’s appeal in that case.   
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ISSUES 
Dahl states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Dahl’s motion to suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Should the Court dismiss Dahl’s appeal in Docket No. 44004 (Canyon 
County Case No. CR-2015-9825), because Dahl does not raise any 
appellate issue in relation to that case? 
 
2. Has Dahl failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to 
 suppress?  More specifically, has Dahl failed to show error in the district 
 court’s conclusion that the evidence Dahl sought to suppress was not 
 subject to suppression because it was not the product or result of any 
 unlawful police conduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
This Court Should Dismiss The Appeal In Docket No. 44004 Because Dahl Has 
Not Raised Any Appellate Issue In That Case 
 
 The appeal in Docket No. 44004 is from the district court’s order 
dismissing a misdemeanor paraphernalia charge in Canyon County Case No. 
CR-2015-9825.  (See R., pp.7, 10, 133.)  However, because the paraphernalia 
charge was dismissed, “Dahl does not raise an issue in this appeal with respect 
to CR-2015-9825.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.6 n.3.)  Because Dahl has assigned no 
error to the order of dismissal in Docket No. 44004, the appeal in that case is 
effectively moot and should be dismissed.  State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 
232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (quotations and citation omitted) (“An issue becomes 
moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of 
being concluded by judicial relief.”). 
 
II. 
Dahl Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
 
A. Introduction 
 Dahl challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing as he did 
below that the drug evidence found in his room would not have been discovered 
but for Officer Hoeksema’s illegal entry into his home (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10), 
and that “the State did not meet its burden of establishing the consent given by 
Mr. Dahl and/or his mother was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry to 
expunge the taint of the unlawful police conduct” (Id., pp.10-12).  He also argues 
that, “even if the consent given by Mr. Dahl and/or his mother was sufficiently 
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attenuated from the illegal entry, the state did not meet its burden of establishing 
by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of that consent.”  (Id., pp.12-14 
(capitalization altered, underlining omitted).)  Dahl’s arguments fail.   
 Even assuming Officer Hoeksema’s initial entry into the home based on 
the consent given by an eight-year-old child was unlawful, the district court 
correctly applied the law to the facts when it concluded that the drug evidence 
found in Dahl’s room was not the product or result of that initial unlawful entry but 
was instead independently justified by Dahl’s and his mother’s subsequently 
given consents.  Although Dahl argued below neither he nor his mother gave any 
independent consent, he did so only after the hearing on his motion to suppress, 
and he never argued the consents were not voluntary.  Because Dahl failed to 
timely raise the issue at a point where the state could respond to it with the 
presentation of relevant evidence, the issue was not preserved and this Court 
should decline to consider it.  If the Court does reach the merits of the issue, the 
existing record supports the district court’s finding that the consents given by 
Dahl and his mother were “valid.”  (R., p.74.)  Dahl has failed to show the district 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accept[s] 
the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but 
[the court] freely review[s] the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
as found.”  State v. Kapelle, 158 Idaho 121, 124, 344 P.3d 901, 904 (Ct. App. 
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2014) (citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 
(Ct. App. 1996)).  “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility 
of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
inferences is vested in the trial court.”  Id. (citing State v. Valdez-Molina, 
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 
786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
 
C. Dahl Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Conclusion That 
The Drug Evidence Found In Dahl’s Bedroom Was Not Subject To 
Suppression Because It Was Not The Product Or Result Of Any Unlawful 
Police Conduct 
 
  The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:  “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV.  “Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally 
illegal and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be 
rendered reasonable by an individual’s consent.”  State v. Kapelle, 158 Idaho 
121, 128, 344 P.3d 901, 908 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 
516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 
963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
 In this case, Officer Hoeksema entered Dahl’s home after receiving 
permission to do so from an eight-year-old child.  (R., p.64.)  Relying on case law 
from another state and on Idaho cases and statutes it deemed instructive, the 
district court concluded, as a matter of law, both that the child did not have actual 
authority to consent to the entry of the home and that it was not reasonable for 
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the officers to believe she had authority to consent or that her consent was 
voluntary.  (R., pp.70-72.)  The court nevertheless declined to suppress the 
evidence Officer Hoeksema discovered while in the home because Dahl failed to 
meet his burden of establishing the evidence would not have been found “but for 
the initial invalid entry.”  (R., pp.72-74.)  Contrary to Dahl’s assertions on appeal, 
correct application of the law to the facts supports the district court’s ruling. 
 As explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Kapelle, supra: 
The exclusionary rule calls for suppression of evidence that is 
gained through unconstitutional governmental activity.  This 
prohibition against the use of derivative evidence extends to the 
indirect as well as the direct fruit of the government’s misconduct.  
Nevertheless, suppression is not justified unless the challenged 
evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental 
activity.  That is, evidence will not be excluded as fruit unless the 
illegality is at least the but for cause of the discovery of the 
evidence.   
 
 Where a defendant has moved to suppress evidence 
allegedly gained through unconstitutional police conduct, the state 
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that the 
challenged evidence is untainted, but the defendant bears an initial 
burden of going forward with evidence to show a factual nexus 
between the illegality and the state’s acquisition of the evidence.  
This requires a prima facie showing that the evidence sought to be 
suppressed would not have come to light but for the government’s 
unconstitutional conduct.  By expressing the query as a “but for” 
test, we do not imply that a defendant bears the burden to prove a 
negative – that the state would not or could not have discovered 
the evidence on any set of hypothetical circumstances that could 
have arisen absent the illegal search.  Rather, the defendant need 
only show that, on the events that did take place, the discovery of 
the evidence was a product or result of the unlawful police conduct. 
 
158 Idaho at 127, 344 P.3d at 907 (brackets, quotations and internal citations 
omitted; paragraph break added for ease of readability). 
  12 
 Applying the foregoing standards to the facts before it in Kapelle, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Kapelle’s suppression motion because 
Kapelle failed to meet his burden of establishing the evidence he sought to 
suppress was the product of any unconstitutional police conduct.  158 Idaho at 
128, 344 P.3d at 908.  In that case, two officers searching for a “wanted felon” 
approached Kapelle’s trailer home on foot from the bottom of the driveway that 
led to the trailer.  Id. at 123, 344 P.3d at 903.  Although neither officer was in 
uniform, both “had their badges hanging visibly on their chests” and both had 
“their guns drawn.”  Id.  Upon hearing loud music and voices coming from inside 
the trailer, “[o]ne of the officers walked around to the rear [of the trailer] in order 
to prevent any escape from a back window.”  Id.  Kapelle saw “the officer in his 
backyard and came out his front door to investigate,” at which point the officer 
who was “in front of the trailer informed Kapelle they were with the sheriff’s office 
and inquired whether the wanted suspect was there.”  Id.  Overhearing the 
conversation, the officer who was in the backyard walked back to the front of the 
trailer.  Id.  Kapelle then told both officers that he knew the suspect but that the 
suspect was not there.  Id.  After advising Kapelle that they could not leave until 
they confirmed the suspect was not there, the officers asked Kapelle’s 
permission to enter the trailer to look for the suspect, and Kapelle agreed.  Id.  
“Once inside, the officers immediately smelled the odor of raw marijuana.”  Id.  
The officers thereafter searched the trailer pursuant to Kapelle’s consent and 
found evidence of marijuana manufacturing, as well as an unlawfully possessed 
firearm.  Id.  In the prosecution that followed, Kapelle moved to suppress the 
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evidence as being the product of an unlawful search, but the district court denied 
the motion.  Id. 
 On appeal, Kapelle argued the evidence against him should have been 
suppressed because “the officers entered the curtilage of his property without 
any legitimate societal purpose and, thus, conducted an unlawful warrantless 
search.”  Id. at 124, 344 P.3d at 904.  The Court of Appeals agreed, in part, 
holding that while the “initial entry onto Kapelle’s property for purposes of 
conducting a criminal investigation was constitutionally reasonable,” the “officer’s 
conduct in approaching the home with his gun drawn, circling around back of the 
trailer and stating he would not leave until able to search the trailer … constituted 
a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 126-27, 
344 P.3d at 906-07.  The Court rejected Kapelle’s argument that the illegal 
search constituted a basis for suppression, however, because Kapelle failed to 
carry his threshold burden of demonstrating the evidence against him would not 
have come to light but for the officer’s unconstitutional conduct.  Id. at 127-28, 
344 P.3d at 907-08.  Specifically, the Court reasoned: 
Here, the officer’s illegal search [his entry into Kapelle’s backyard] 
did not yield any incriminating evidence, nor any evidence which 
would have affected Kapelle’s decision to grant consent to enter 
and search his trailer.  Furthermore, by the time Kapelle consented 
to the entry, this officer had returned to the front of the trailer.  
Thus, the illegal search had ended and the officer was again in a 
place he was lawfully entitled to be. 
 
 Moreover, while the officers approached Kapelle with their 
guns drawn, the officers did not aim their guns at Kapelle and kept 
them pointed toward the ground.  Given the circumstances of the 
encounter (search for a dangerous suspect), it was reasonable for 
the officers to take precautions.  Furthermore, the officers’ 
conversation with Kapelle appeared to be nonaccusatory and 
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cordial in nature.  When requesting consent to search Kapelle’s 
home, an officer inquired, “Brother, you know we can’t leave unless 
we know he is here or not.  Can we just make sure he is not hiding 
on the crapper or just sitting on the couch right there behind you.”  
The officers did not threaten Kapelle or create an overbearing 
environment.  Therefore, we hold Kapelle has failed to demonstrate 
his consent to enter and search, and the resulting evidence, was 
the direct or indirect result of the illegal search. 
 
Id. at 128, 344 P.3d at 908. Because Kapelle failed to show any causal 
connection between the initial illegal search and the evidence sought to be 
suppressed, exclusion of the evidence was not warranted.  Id.; see also State v. 
McBaine, 144 Idaho 130, 157 P.3d 1101 (Ct. App. 2007) (upholding denial of 
suppression motion where defendant failed to demonstrate a causal link 
between officer’s initial unlawful entry into home and defendant’s subsequent 
consent to search), cited in Kapelle, 158 Idaho at 127-28, 344 P.3d at 907-908. 
 In this case, even assuming that Officer Hoeksema’s initial entry into 
Dahl’s home pursuant to the permission of an eight-year-old child was unlawful, 
the district court correctly concluded suppression of the drug evidence the officer 
subsequently found in Dahl’s room was not warranted because Dahl, like 
Kapelle, failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that that evidence would not 
have been discovered but for the officer’s initial unlawful entry.  Officer 
Hoeksema testified that, after being granted entry by the child, he “walked into 
the main entryway and stood there for the remainder of the time until [Dahl’s] 
mother, Eleanor Dahl, came down” the stairs.  (Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.9, L.15.)  While 
in the entryway, the officer “might have looked over to see” what was in an 
adjacent hallway but, as in Kapelle, there is no indication that the officer 
observed any incriminating evidence, or any evidence at all, that would have 
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affected Mrs. Dahl’s decision to consent when the officer asked her permission 
to go upstairs.  (Tr., p.9, Ls.2-11.)  Although Officer Hoeksema was still in the 
entryway when Mrs. Dahl gave her consent (see Tr., p.9, Ls.2-15, p.15, Ls.7-24), 
there is nothing in the record to suggest that Mrs. Dahl, or even a reasonable 
person in her position, would have been compelled by Officer Hoeksema’s mere 
presence in the entryway to allow him further access to the house.  There is no 
indication in the record that Officer Hoeksema ever drew his service weapon, 
and a review of the audio recording of the encounter demonstrates that the 
officer’s demeanor was in no way overbearing or threatening.  (Exhibit A at 
07:24-8:25.)  Like the officers in Kapelle, Officer Hoeksema and his partner were 
looking for a wanted felon, and Officer Hoeksema asked Mrs. Dahl, in a cordial 
and nonaccusatory tone, “Do you mind if we go up there [to Dahl’s room] and at 
least clear to make sure that he is not here?”  (R., p.66; Exhibit A at 07:24-
08:25.)  Given all of these circumstances – including the facts that Officer 
Hoeksema limited his initial entry to the main entryway, did not observe or search 
for any incriminating evidence while there, and did not otherwise create a 
threatening or overbearing environment – Dahl has failed to demonstrate that 
Mrs. Dahl’s consent to allow Officer Hoeksema to accompany her upstairs to 
Dahl’s bedroom was either a direct or indirect result of the initial unlawful entry. 
 Dahl has likewise failed to show his own consent to search resulted, either 
directly or indirectly, from Officer Hoeksema’s initial unlawful entry.  By the time 
the officer asked Dahl for consent to enter and search his bedroom, Mrs. Dahl 
had already given the officer her express consent to accompany her upstairs and 
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had facilitated the officer’s contact with Dahl by knocking on Dahl’s door and 
telling him, “[T]he police would like to see your room, please.  […] They just want 
to make sure James isn’t here.”  (R., pp.66-67 (bracketed ellipses in original); 
Exhibit A at 07:24-08:43.)  After Dahl opened his bedroom door, Officer 
Hoeksema exchanged pleasantries with him, told him, “I’m here for James [the 
wanted felon],” and asked, “Where is he [James] at?”  (R., p.67; Exhibit A at 
09:19-09:24.)  When Dahl replied, “James is not here,” the officer asked, “Okay, 
do you mind if I look,” at which point Dahl permitted the officer to enter his room.  
(R, p.67; Exhibit A at 09:24-09:30.)  There is no indication on this record that 
Dahl was even aware the officer had initially entered the home pursuant to the 
consent of a child, much less that the initial unlawful entry had any effect on 
Dahl’s decision to allow the officer access to his room.  Because the drug 
evidence the officer subsequently discovered in Dahl’s room was the result of 
Dahl’s independent consent, and not the result of the officer’s initial unlawful 
entry, the district court correctly denied Dahl’s motion to suppress. 
 Dahl argues he met his burden of showing “a factual nexus between the 
illegal entry and the discovery of evidence in [his] room,” because his “room 
would not, and could not, have been searched if the officer was not present in 
his house.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)  Dahl’s argument is unavailing because 
he cannot show the requisite factual nexus between the unlawful entry and the 
discovery of the evidence sought to be suppressed merely by pointing out that 
there was an unlawful entry.  Rather, because Dahl and his mother both 
consented to the officer’s presence in the home after the initial unlawful entry, it 
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was Dahl’s burden to show that neither he nor his mother would have granted 
consent but for the initial illegality.  Dahl has never made such a claim, much 
less presented any evidence to support it.  Because the fact of the unlawful entry 
is not itself sufficient to demonstrate “a factual nexus between the illegality and 
the state’s acquisition of the evidence,” the district court correctly concluded Dahl 
failed to meet his burden of “establish[ing] that but for the initial invalid entry the 
seizure [of the drug evidence] would not have occurred” (R., p.74). 
 Although Dahl does not specifically argue he and his mother would not 
have consented “but for” Officer Hoeksema’s initial unlawful entry, he does claim 
the consents he and his mother gave were not “sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal entry to expunge the taint of the unlawful police conduct.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.10-12.)  This argument is irrelevant.  As explained by the Court of 
Appeals in Kapelle, supra, “attenuation analysis is only appropriate where, as a 
threshold matter, courts determine that the challenged evidence is in some 
sense the product of illegal governmental activity.”  Kapelle, 158 Idaho at 128, 
344 P.3d at 908 (internal quotations omitted) (citing New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 
14, 19 (1990); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)).  Because, for 
the reasons stated above, Dahl failed to carry his burden of showing the drug 
evidence he sought to suppress was a product of the officer’s unlawful entry, 
“there is no occasion for application of the attenuation doctrine.”  Kapelle, 
158 Idaho at 128, 344 P.3d at 908. 
 Even if attenuation analysis were appropriate, correct application of the 
law to the facts established in relation to Dahl’s suppression motion shows 
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Officer Hoeksema’s discovery of the drug evidence in Dahl’s bedroom was 
sufficiently attenuated from his initial unlawful entry to expunge the taint of the 
initial illegality.  The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted a three-factor test to 
determine whether unlawful conduct has been adequately attenuated.  See State 
v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004).  The factors to be 
considered are: “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the 
acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and 
(3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  Not all of these factors must be resolved in favor of the state 
before evidence will be deemed not subject to the exclusionary rule.  State v. 
Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549, 6 P.3d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 2000).  “The test 
only requires a balancing of the relative weights of all the factors, viewed 
together, in order to determine if the police exploited an illegality to discover 
evidence.”  Id. (citing United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 549-550 (4th Cir. 
1998)).   
 Here there was no exploitation of the alleged illegality.  It is undisputed 
that approximately five minutes elapsed between Officer Hoeksema’s initial entry 
into Dahl’s home pursuant to the consent of the eight-year-old child and his entry 
into Dahl’s room pursuant to Dahl’s consent.  Although the district court 
subsequently found the officer should have known an eight-year-old could not 
grant the officer consent to enter Dahl’s home, suppression is not warranted 
because there is no indication the officer acted in flagrant violation of the law or 
for any improper purpose.  Indeed, as the district court correctly observed in its 
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memorandum decision denying Dahl’s motion to suppress, “Idaho’s appellate 
courts have not squarely addressed whether a child may legally consent to a 
search of the home,” nor are there any Idaho statutes “directly on point.” 
(R., pp.70-71.)  Even assuming the district court was correct in its post hoc 
determination that the child could not legally consent, Officer Hoeksema’s act of 
relying on the child’s consent as a basis to enter the home – when nothing in 
Idaho law at the time plainly prohibited such reliance – in no way demonstrates 
any intent by the officer to violate Dahl’s rights.   
 Nor is there any evidence that, in entering the home, Officer Hoeksema 
acted with some other untoward purpose.  As set forth in more detail above, the 
officer was at Dahl’s home to look for a wanted felon.  (R., p.64.)  When the child 
let the officer into Dahl’s home, the officer restricted his movements to the 
entryway and waited for Mrs. Dahl to come downstairs.  (Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.9, 
L.11.)  The officer did not look for or observe any incriminating evidence while in 
the entryway, and he did not otherwise exploit his presence inside the threshold 
of Dahl’s home to obtain information or evidence to which he would not 
otherwise have been privy.  (Id.)  
 Likewise, Officer Hoeksema did not learn of the drug evidence in Dahl’s 
room by being present in the entryway, but instead by the intervening 
circumstances of Dahl’s and his mother’s consents.  Contrary to Dahl’s 
assertions (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12), there is no indication that those consents 
were inextricably intertwined with the officer’s initial unlawful entry; instead, for 
the reasons already set forth above (including the fact that Dahl was not even 
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aware of the circumstances of the officer’s initial entry into the home), the record 
supports the district court’s determination that the consents were independent of 
the officer’s initial entry and would have been granted even had the eight-year-
old child not initially permitted the officer in Dahl’s home.  Because the record 
shows the officer did not discover the drug evidence as a result of any 
exploitation of his initial unlawful entry, Dahl has failed to show the district court 
erred by not suppressing the evidence as the fruit of the alleged illegality. 
 
D. Dahl’s Appellate Challenge To The Voluntariness Of His And His Mother’s 
 Consents Is Not Preserved Because Dahl Failed To Assert Any Such 
 Challenge Below 
 
 As an alternative basis for suppression, Dahl argues on appeal the state 
failed to meet its burden of establishing the voluntariness of his and his mother’s 
consents.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-14.)  This Court should decline to consider 
Dahl’s appellate claim because Dahl never raised an alleged lack of 
voluntariness of his and his mother’s consents as a basis for suppression below.  
 On appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress, a defendant “may 
not allege to this Court that the district court’s decision was in error based on an 
argument that was never presented to the district court for consideration.”  State 
v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 368, 347 P.3d 1025, 1029 (2015).  “Even when a 
defendant mentions the general basis for a motion to suppress, his or her 
arguments on appeal are limited by what was argued to the trial court.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  In this case, Dahl moved to suppress the drug evidence 
against him based solely on his assertion that the evidence was the fruit of an 
unlawful entry into his home.  (R., pp.33, 35-41.)  Dahl did argue, at the 
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conclusion of the suppression hearing and in a “Notice of Supplemental 
Authority” filed one day after the hearing, that neither he nor his mother gave any 
consent.  (Tr., p.21, Ls.19-21, p.22, L.24 – p.23, L.1; R., pp.56-57.)  But Dahl 
never challenged the voluntariness of his or his mother’s consents.  (See 
generally R., pp.33, 35-41, 56-57; Tr.)  Moreover, the state specifically objected 
to Dahl’s post-hearing assertion that neither Dahl nor his mother gave consent, 
noting (1) the “sole argument” Dahl made in his brief in support of his motion to 
suppress “was that the initial entry was unconstitutional because the young 
female who answered the door could not have given actual consent,” and (2) by 
failing to raise the issue before the suppression hearing, Dahl deprived the state 
of notice and an opportunity (or even an incentive) to present evidence to prove 
that Dahl and his mother consented.  (R., pp.61-63; see also Tr., p.24, L.24 – 
p.25, L.21.)  Although the district court ultimately found that “both Ms. Dahl and 
Mr. Dahl consented” to the search that led to the discovery of the drug evidence 
and that those consents were “valid,” that determination appears to have been 
made only in relation to the court’s finding that Dahl failed to carry his burden of 
establishing a causal connection between the initial unlawful entry and the 
discovery of the drug evidence, not in response to any contrary claim by Dahl 
that neither his nor his mother’s consents were voluntary.  (See generally R., 
pp.72-74.)  Because Dahl never challenged the voluntariness of his or his 
mother’s consents below, his appellate challenge to the voluntariness of those 
consents should not be considered.  See Armstrong, supra.   
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E. Even If This Court Considers Dahl’s Appellate Challenge To The 
 Voluntariness Of His And His Mother’s Consents, The Existing Record 
 Supports The District Court’s Finding That Those Consents Were “Valid” 
 
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973) (citations omitted); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 
(2001).  Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-
26 (citations omitted).  The voluntariness of an individual’s consent is a question 
of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances.  Varie, 
135 Idaho at 852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49).  In 
order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of duress or coercion, either direct 
or implied.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.  The mere presence of officers asking 
for consent to search is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute improper 
police duress or coercion.  See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).  
Instead, the court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and find 
consent involuntary only if “coerced by threats or force, or granted only in 
submission to a claim of lawful authority ….”  State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 
158, 657 P.2d 17, 22 (1983) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 233).   
Even if this Court considers Dahl’s unpreserved challenge to the 
voluntariness of his and his mother’s consents, a review of the existing record in 
light of the foregoing legal standards shows those consents were voluntary.  As 
evidenced by the audio recording of the encounter, Officer Hoeksema’s 
interactions with Dahl and his mother were cordial and nonaccusatory in nature.  
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(See generally Exhibit A.)  He introduced himself to Mrs. Dahl, explained he was 
looking for a wanted felon, and asked Mrs. Dahl, in a non-threatening manner, if 
he could go upstairs to Dahl’s room to look for the suspect.  (Exhibit A at 07:24-
08:25; R., p.66.)  Although the officer told Mrs. Dahl she and others in the home 
“could be arrested for felony harboring” if the suspect was there, that statement 
was not in and of itself coercive.  See, e.g. State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 
911, 243 P.3d at 1093, 1099 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 
774, 779-80, 152 P.3d 645, 650-51 (Ct. App. 2006)) (informing suspect “officer 
intends to do something that the officer is legally authorized to do under the 
circumstances … does not amount to coercion”).  The officer never threatened 
Mrs. Dahl or displayed any show of force that would have compelled Mrs. Dahl to 
permit the officer to accompany her upstairs to Dahl’s room.  (See generally 
Exhibit A.) 
Nor is there any indication that Dahl’s consent to search was the product 
of any police coercion.  After Dahl opened his bedroom door in response to his 
mother’s and Officer Hoeksema’s request that he do so, Officer Hoeksema 
exchanged pleasantries with Dahl and told him why he was there.  (Exhibit A at 
09:19-09:24; R., p.67.)  Like his encounter with Mrs. Dahl, the officer’s encounter 
with Dahl was pleasant, nonaccusatory and non-threatening.  (See generally 
Exhibit A.)  The officer explained to Dahl why he was there and asked Dahl if he 
“mind[ed]” if the officer looked in his bedroom.  (Exhibit A at 09:24-09:42; 
R., p.67.)  Although Dahl’s response is not audible on the audio recording, 
Officer Hoeksema testified that Dahl “shook his head and motioned for [the 
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officer] to walk inside.”  (Tr., p.18, Ls.19-22.)  Viewed in their totality, the 
foregoing circumstances show that Dahl’s act of doing so was voluntary and not 
the result of any police duress or coercion.   
In arguing that neither his nor his mother’s consents were voluntary, Dahl 
fails to point to any evidence of police coercion.  He argues the “atmosphere” in 
which he and his mother consented was “coercive” because it was early in the 
morning (Appellant’s brief, p.13), but he has failed to cite any authority for the 
proposition that the earliness of the hour – in this case, 8:36 a.m. (see R., p.65) 
– transforms an otherwise cordial police encounter into a coercive one.  He also 
argues the fact that he did not audibly respond to the officer’s request to enter 
his bedroom, but instead motioned for the officer to walk inside, shows only that 
he acquiesced to the officer’s show of authority.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)  
This argument fails because the officer did not show any authority or display any 
force; he simply asked Dahl if he “mind[ed]” if he looked in his bedroom. 
(R., p.67.)  That Dahl permitted him to do so does not transform the officer’s 
request into a show of authority.  Finally, Dahl contends Mrs. Dahl’s consent was 
not voluntary because the state failed to show she had actual or apparent 
authority to consent to a search of Dahl’s bedroom.  (Appellant’s brief, p.13.)  
This argument fails for at least two reasons.  First, Dahl never made this 
argument below and, as such, it is not preserved.  Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 368, 
347 P.3d at 1029.  Second, it was Dahl, not his mother, who permitted the officer 
to enter Dahl’s bedroom.  (R., p.67.)  Because the officer entered Dahl’s 
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bedroom pursuant to Dahl’s consent, Mrs. Dahl’s authority or lack thereof to also 
consent to the search of Dahl’s bedroom is irrelevant.  
 The district court correctly concluded that Dahl failed to carry his burden 
of showing any causal connection between the officer’s initial unlawful entry and 
the discovery of the drug evidence in Dahl’s bedroom. The court also correctly 
concluded the evidence was discovered pursuant to Dahl’s and his mother’s 
valid consents.  Dahl has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district 
court’s order denying his motion to suppress. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Dahl’s conviction and 
sentence and the district court’s order denying Dahl’s motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 4th day of January, 2017. 
 
       
  
 __/s/___________________________ 
 LORI A. FLEMING 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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